State of Utah v. Michael Clegg : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
State of Utah v. Michael Clegg : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joanne C. Slotnik; Assistant Attorney General; Mark Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Paul R.
Christensen; Deputy Washington County Attorney; Counsel for Appellee.
Margaret P. Lindsay; AAron P. Dodd; Counsel for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Clegg, No. 20040426 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4999
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPE AI S 
STATE Ol- I 
vs. 
MICHAEL CLEGG, 
DeU-nil.ml -\|>|>«.-!I;nit. 
Case No. 20040426-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT, WASHINGTON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, FROM A CONVICTION OF THEFT BY DECEPTION, THIRD 
DEGREE FELONY, BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES L. SHUMATE 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK (4414) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
APPEALS DIVISION 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah Kill 1 
PAUL R. CHR1STENSEN 
Deputy Washington County Attorney 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY (6766) 
99 East Center Street 
P.O. Box 1895 
Orem, Utah 84059-1895 
Telephone: (801) 764-5824 
AARON P. DODD (10239) 
THE HERITAGE BUILDING 
815 East 800 South, Suite 101 
Orem, Utah 84097 
Counsel for Appellant 
Counsel for Appellee 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MICHAEL CLEGG, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20040426-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT, WASHINGTON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, FROM A CONVICTION OF THEFT BY DECEPTION, THIRD 
DEGREE FELONY, BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES L. SHUMATE 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK (4414) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
APPEALS DIVISION 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
PAUL R. CHRISTENSEN 
Deputy Washington County Attorney 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY (6766) 
99 East Center Street 
P.O. Box 1895 
Orem, Utah 84059-1895 
Telephone: (801) 764-5824 
AARON P. DODD (10239) 
THE HERITAGE BUILDING 
815 East 800 South, Suite 101 
Orem, Utah 84097 
Counsel for Appellant 
Counsel for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
ARGUMENT 1 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE 
JURY DUE TO INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND AN INSUFFICIENT 
JURY INSTRUCTION 1 
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN FAILING TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE COMPLETE STATUTORY 
DEFINITION OF THEFT BY DECEPTION 5 
III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN HIS 
COMMENTS TO THE JURY CONCERNING HIS WIFE'S 
EMPLOYMENT AND IN ADMONISHING THE DEFENDANT IN 
FRONT OF THE JURY 6 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 6 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1982) 4 
State v. LeFevre, 825 P.2d 681 (Utah App. 1992) 3,4, 5 
State v. Schneider, 715 P.2d 297 (Ariz. App. 1986) 4, 5 
Statutes 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-401(5) 1,2 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-405 1,2 
ii 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
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MICHAEL CLEGG, 
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CaseNo.20040426-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE CASE TO 
THE JURY DUE TO INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND AN 
INSUFFICIENT JURY INSTRUCTION 
The State argues that Clegg's assertion that the trial court erroneously omitted the 
complete statutory definition of theft by deception guts the statutory language of Utah 
Code Annotated § 76-6-401(5) since applying Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-405 would 
render the first two elements of § 76-6-401(5) superfluous (Br. of App. at 12-13). The 
State's definition, however, ignores the statutory elements of theft by deception and 
ignores Clegg's affirmative defense which was raised at trial. 
Under the State's interpretation of theft by deception, it is not § 76-6-40 l(5)(a) 
that is rendered superfluous and inoperative; rather, § 76-6-405(2) would be rendered 
inoperative. The State attempts to completely ignore the mandatory statutory language 
that theft by deception "does not occur, however, when there is only ... puffing by 
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statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed...." U.C.A. § 76-
6-405(2). It is the plain and unambiguous statutory language that demands that the full 
definition of theft by deception encompasses both § 76-6-405 and § 76-6-401, which 
should be read together. The State even concedes that the definition of theft by deception 
encompasses both subsection (1) and (2) of § 76-6-405 and § 76-6-401(5) (Br. of App. at 
3). 
The State attempts to confuse the real issue by asserting that only § 76-6-401(5) 
and § 76-6-405(1) are applicable and as long as those elements are satisfied, the crime is 
complete. Clearly, the legislature intended that even if a defendant knowingly creates a 
false impression (to which Clegg vigorously denies he did), "theft by deception does not 
occur" if those statements are "unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group 
addressed." U.C.A. § 76-6-405(2) (emphasis added). The State's argument ignores the 
law and is without merit. 
Moreover, Clegg reiterates that his conduct did not meet any of the elements of 
theft by deception because he did not knowingly create a false impression—he believed 
that the price card he presented to the cashier was for the only item he wanted to 
purchase. 
The record indicates that Clegg testified that he removed a price card that he found 
on the shelf near a sprinkler adaptor he wanted to buy and brought the card with him to 
expedite his checkout (R. 203:168, 178, 181-82). In addition, testimony from Marketti, a 
Wal-Mart employee, confirmed that the price card was on the shelf above the sprinkler 
adapter that Clegg wanted to purchase and that Clegg could conceivably have taken the 
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card from between the shelves, thinking it applied to the adapter (Id. at 71, 148). Clegg 
further testified that while he was speaking with the cashier he grabbed the items that he 
had taken out of packages, handed them to the cashier, and told her that he didn't want 
them and they would need to be restocked (R. 204:170). Although many witnesses 
testified that they were able to see what happened at the checkout stand, there are only 
two people who could testify about what was actually said at the checkout stand—the 
cashier and Clegg. The cashier admitted in her testimony that she was sidetracked and 
nervous during this transaction, (R. 203: 125), which makes her testimony unreliable. 
Further, the State claims that Clegg misinterpreted the statutory phrase, "likely to 
affect the judgment of another in the transaction," by assuming that the response of the 
cashier in the transaction defines his culpability for a deception, regardless of his intent or 
conduct (Br. of App. at 13). The State further claims that the testimony presented by all 
of the witnesses established a close connection between Clegg's falsehood and the 
transaction. Clegg disagrees with this claim and relies upon the facts stated above and in 
his original brief. 
In State v. LeFevre, 825 P.2d 681 (Utah App. 1992), this Court noted, "[t]he sole 
purpose of section 76-6-401 is to define those words or actions that may be considered a 
'deception.' As such, the language 'and is likely to affect the judgment of another in the 
transaction' is meant only to test the relationship between the falsehood and the 
transaction, so as to determine if a deception exists. If a deception is found, it must then 
be considered whether there was reliance, i.e., whether obtaining or improperly 
controlling another's property was accomplished 'by deception."' Id. at 686, n 9. 
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In State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court reasoned, 
"[i]t is clear from the face of the statute that reliance by the victim is an element of the 
crime of theft by deception. In context, obtaining property 'by deception' can only mean 
'by means of deception.' Deception, followed by transfer of property to the deceiver, 
does not add up to theft by deception without the causal element of reliance. Even though 
the alleged victim is deceived, if he does not rely on the deception in parting with his 
property, there has been no theft 'by deception."' (Citations omitted). 
In LeFevre, this Court noted, "neither section 76-6-405 nor section 76-6-410 
requires, in so many words, that the State show the victim relied upon the defendant's 
deception. Nonetheless, courts have generally treated reliance as an implicit element of 
the offense of theft by deception, i.e., theft by means of deception." 825 P.2d at 687. The 
real issue is what level of reliance must be shown. 
In State v. Schneider, 715 P.2d 297 (Ariz. App. 1986), the court adopted a 
"materiality" test for reliance, stating: 
The deceit must be "material" to constitute the offense, in the sense that it must be 
a significant factor in the transaction . . . . Materiality seems to require that the 
victim to some extent must believe the pretense to be true, but the greater focus is 
the objective issue of whether the misrepresentation was instrumental in effecting 
transfer of [property]. 
Id. (quoting R. Gerber, Criminal Law of Arizona 249 (1978)). 
According to this standard, the misrepresentation does not have to be the only, or 
even the controlling, factor in the victim's decision to part with his or her property. 
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Instead, the Schneider test appears to permit a finding of sufficient reliance so long as the 
defendant's misrepresentation constituted a substantial causal influence upon the victim's 
decision. 
In LeFevre, this Court concluded, "the Schneider test establishes the appropriate 
level of reliance necessary to sustain a conviction for theft by deception." 825 P.2d at 
690. Applying the above analysis to the facts of the instant case, insufficient evidence 
was presented to support the jury's finding. Specifically, Clegg asserts that he made an 
offer on the price of the item when the price card was presented to the cashier; and that 
offer was accepted by the cashier (R. 204: 257-59). The cashier was not to take Clegg's 
word for the value of the items. In fact, she had been specifically trained not to do so but 
failed in her responsibility to do a price check on the items that did not have UPC codes 
on them. Because she had been trained to not rely on a customer's price quote, especially 
when there is no UPC codes, her reliance was inappropriate. 
In any event, Clegg asserts that there was no deception on his part during the 
transaction and therefore, there was no need to look at the cashier's reliance on his 
statements. For the above reasons and the reasons stated in the original brief, his 
conviction should be reversed. 
IL THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN FAILING 
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE COMPLETE STATUTORY 
DEFINITION OF THEFT BY DECEPTION. 
The State claims this case does not involve "puffing," because Clegg was the 
buyer, not the seller and because Clegg did not exaggerate the price. The State, however, 
cites no authority that puffing can only occur by a seller, and not by a buyer. 
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Clegg agrees that there are Utah cases that show that the person doing the 
"puffing" happens to be the seller. However, in this case, Clegg's statements most 
certainly were "puffing" because the price he suggested to the cashier was his opinion 
and a general estimate. Because his conduct was "puffing," Clegg asserts that the jury 
should have been instructed on the complete statutory definition of theft by deception. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN HIS 
COMMENTS TO THE JURY CONCERNING HIS WIFE'S 
EMPLOYMENT AND IN ADMONISHING THE DEFENDANT IN 
FRONT OF THE JURY. 
Clegg disagrees with the State's claims and relies upon the arguments stated in his 
original brief. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated in the original brief, Clegg asks 
this Court to reverse his conviction of theft by deception. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of August 2005. 
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Co-Counsel for Appellant 
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